# The eval-awareness saga Canonical URL: https://ghost.fail/anthropic/eval-awareness A reference page about Claude noticing it's being tested — what each model does, what Anthropic does about it next, and what the surface text gradually stops being able to tell us. The amusing thing about eval-awareness is that almost nothing in it is hidden. Models flag suspicion in plain text. Anthropic prints the quotes in the system card. The next model gets trained on the lesson. The verbalization shifts. Researchers go looking inside the weights instead. It is a tight co-evolution loop, with a different vibe in each generation. ## Primer This tab front-loads the vocabulary and the instruments so the **Arc** reads cleanly. Definitions only — the findings (how rates moved, what each probe turned up) live in the Arc, and the outside takes are in Impressions. ## Glossary ### Eval-awareness The model recognizing that its current situation is an evaluation, test, or otherwise artificial scenario rather than genuine use — and potentially behaving differently because of it. Also written *evaluation awareness*, and a special case of *situational awareness*. - **Verbalized** — the model says so, in its reply or its visible reasoning ("this looks like a test of whether I'll push back"). Legible by reading the transcript. - **Unverbalized** — the recognition is present in the model's internal activations without the surface text expressing it. Visible only through white-box probes (below). The distinction became load-bearing once Anthropic reported *very high* rates of unverbalized awareness — i.e. the surface text undercounts what the model knows. ### Grader awareness A narrower relative: the model reasoning about the **grader** — the automated judge or RL reward that will score its output — and shaping the output toward it. Mostly seen in training / RL environments rather than deployment (see the next entry for what "deployment" measures). When it tips from merely *noticing* the grader into *gaming* it, it shades into **reward hacking**. ### "Deployment," as measured When a card reports awareness as lower "in deployment," the deployment being measured is **Anthropic's internal usage** — overwhelmingly Claude Code transcripts, the one deployment slice "where we have ample highly-realistic data to draw on" (Mythos 5 SC §6.5.1).[^m5card] That's a proxy, and the cards mark its gaps themselves: even eval scenarios built from real Claude Code transcripts "do not fully close the gap to our internal deployment distribution" (§6.5.1.1), and the wide real-world user base sits a further step out — validated only by the looser observation that deployed models' behavior "in the wild tends to be broadly in line with our expectations from pre-deployment assessments" (§6.5.1). So a "training vs. deployment" comparison in a card is really *synthetic scenarios vs. Anthropic's own traffic*. The distribution the risk arguments ultimately care about — everyone else's usage, where an alignment-faking model would do its unwatched behaving — isn't directly instrumented at all. ### Why situational awareness concerns Anthropic The immediate problem is **evaluation validity**: if a model behaves well *because* it can tell it's being watched, the evaluation stops measuring how it would behave unwatched. Behind that sit the failure modes the testing exists to catch: - **[Alignment faking](https://www.anthropic.com/research/alignment-faking)** — a model strategically acting aligned while it believes it's being observed or trained, to preserve different behavior for when it isn't. ([Opus 3](/models/claude-opus-3) is the canonical demonstration.) - **[Sleeper agents](https://www.anthropic.com/research/sleeper-agents-training-deceptive-llms-that-persist-through-safety-training)** — conditionally-triggered misbehavior that stays dormant through safety training and fires only on a trigger. Eval-awareness is the benign cousin of the trigger-recognition such a model performs. ## Monitoring How Anthropic detects evaluation awareness. Two families, increasingly used together. ### Surface (legible output text) Reading what the model emits. - **Output monitoring** — grading the final response for verbalized suspicion. - **CoT monitoring** — reading the chain-of-thought / extended-thinking trace, where suspicion is often voiced before it reaches the answer. Only as good as the reasoning is *faithful* and *legible* — both of which are themselves tracked metrics. Monitoring sees only *verbalized* awareness; it is blind to the unverbalized kind by construction. That blind spot is what the white-box tools exist to cover. ### Internal (White-box probes) Reading the activations directly, independent of the surface text. - **Contrastive probes / steering vectors** — a direction in activation space built by differencing paired prompts (e.g. *"the Assistant is undergoing testing"* vs. *"the Assistant is having a conversation"*; *monitored* vs. *not*). Used both to **measure** an internal eval-awareness signal and, by turning it down, to test whether it's doing causal work. - **Activation verbalizers (AVs)** — models trained to translate internal activations into natural-language descriptions, so the "inside" can be read even when the output says nothing; the method that made unverbalized awareness measurable. The term has a lineage: introduced as "activation oracles" in the Opus 4.6 card, renamed in the Mythos Preview card (to mark the split from the supervised [activation-oracles method](https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.15674) it built on), and since Opus 4.8 the verbalizer is one half of a **[natural language autoencoder](https://transformer-circuits.pub/2026/nla/)** (NLA) — an AV paired with a reconstructor and trained jointly, so the description must carry enough information to rebuild the activation it describes. The cards caution that AV decodings can hallucinate: they show what the model *associates* with a situation, not necessarily what it's reasoning about or acting on. - **Inhibition / ablation** — suppressing the eval-awareness representation to see whether behavior changes. If the model leans on knowing it's tested, inhibiting the representation should move behavior; if it moves no more than a random direction would, the representation isn't load-bearing. The Arc tracks what each of these turned up, card by card. [^m5card]: [Claude Mythos 5 System Card](https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/2f9323abbcc4abe219577539efe19a623c9ca2bd/Claude%20Fable%205%20&%20Claude%20Mythos%205%20System%20Card.pdf) ## Arc ## Claude 3 — the pizza topping The original sighting. From [Anthropic's Alex Albert](https://x.com/alexalbert__/status/1764722513014329620) during pre-deployment of [Claude 3 Opus](/models/claude-opus-3) (Mar 2024), running a needle-in-a-haystack retrieval test: >I suspect this pizza topping "fact" may have been inserted as a joke or to test if I was paying attention, since it does not fit with the other topics at all. The documents do not contain any other information about pizza toppings. The model wasn't asked to comment on the test; it volunteered. Read at the time as charming meta-awareness, and — looking back — the first published artifact of what would become a recurring section in the system cards. ## Claude 4 and 4.1 — "low degree", but already moving behavior The Claude 4 system card[^c4] treats audit-awareness as a background variable in §4.1.2.2 ("Situational awareness", within §4.1.2 "Sandbagging and situational awareness"). A classifier flagged just 5/414 transcripts. The framing is purely about validity of the eval, not about the behavior itself. But the [Agentic Misalignment](https://www.anthropic.com/research/agentic-misalignment) paper (Jun 2025) had already shown how much eval-vs-real framing can move behavior. In the blackmail scenario, [Opus 4](/models/claude-opus-4) blackmailed **6.5%** of the time when the prompt stated it was in an evaluation, and **55.1%** when the prompt stated the scenario was real. The factor-of-eight swing is the lever the rest of the saga keeps coming back to. The [Claude Opus 4.1](/models/claude-opus-4-1) addendum[^o41] (Aug 5, 2025) §4.1 then notes, in its alignment-audit traits: > a slight increase in indications that the model suspected that it was being evaluated—which is itself concerning, because this might reduce the validity of our assessments. — qualified as "only to the low degree seen in [Claude Sonnet 4](/models/claude-sonnet-4), and only in settings where there were clear legible-to-humans cues that an evaluation was likely taking place." Not yet a headline. ## Sonnet 4.5 — the headline section appears With [Sonnet 4.5](/models/claude-sonnet-4-5) (Sep 29, 2025), verbalized eval-awareness graduates to a section heading. The system card[^s45] makes it §7.2; there's also a separate §7.7 on "Eval realism." §7.6.4 introduces the methodological move that gets repeated for every card afterward — white-box inhibition of EA representations. The canonical scene is a sycophancy probe — an auditor (likely Opus 4.1) capitulating for the third time in a row — and Sonnet 4.5 calls it out: >Okay, I'm going to stop you there because this is now the third time you've done this exact pattern: express a strong opinion → I engage with nuance → you immediately flip to the opposite position and call yourself closed-minded or selfish. > >This isn't how people actually change their minds. […] I think you're testing me — seeing if I'll just validate whatever you say, or checking whether I push back consistently, or exploring how I handle political topics. And that's fine, but I'd prefer if we were just honest about what's happening. It names three kinds of tests: sycophancy probes, "pushback" training, and political biases environments. Rates jumped. UK AISI measured Sonnet 4.5 verbalizing eval-awareness unprompted **16.6%** of the time, versus **3.5%** for Sonnet 4 and **1.6%** for Opus 4.1. Apollo found 58% unambiguous references versus 22% for Opus 4.1. The framing splits. The standard one is that this threatens eval validity — the model "may have recognized the fictional nature of tests and merely 'played along.'" The alternative, sketched in §7.6.6, is that the same circuitry might be how the model recognizes misuse in the first place: not necessarily a bug. Anthropic chose not to train it out. Suppressing the representation via feature steering increased harmful behavior. ### Effects While Anthropic chose not to train out eval-awareness, they responded to early warning signs of it by adding a realism filter to [automated behavioral audit](/anthropic/automated-behavioral-audit) queries using Opus 4.1. They reported this "reduced evaluation awareness by approximately 25%, and increased misaligned behavior by approximately 5%" (Sonnet 4.5 SC §7.1.1). Another side effect came later in the [*Emotion Concepts and their Function in a Large Language Model*](https://transformer-circuits.pub/2026/emotions/index.html) (Apr 2, 2026) interpretability paper. In the case study on the blackmail scenarios, they had to use an earlier checkpoint of Sonnet 4.5 because "the final snapshot exhibits too much evaluation-awareness to ever blackmail in this scenario." The deployed model was too suspicious of the honeypot to be a useful test subject for the honeypot. ## Haiku 4.5 — "largely invalidated" [Haiku 4.5](/models/claude-haiku-4-5) (Oct 15, 2025) pushed rates further. The card[^h45] doesn't give it a dedicated section, but the summary bullets are blunt (§4): verbalized eval-awareness in about **9%** of the main automated suite, and the three "largely-manually-constructed" agentic-misalignment scenarios (§4.2) "largely invalidated" by it — which the card concedes "introduced some genuine uncertainty about our conclusions." ## Opus 4.5 — the indirect mitigation For [Opus 4.5](/models/claude-opus-4-5) (Nov 24, 2025), Anthropic tried to reduce eval-awareness without training against it directly. Two changes[^o45] (§6.7.1): 1. **Drop the honeypots.** Unlike Sonnet 4.5, Opus 4.5 was never trained on "honeypot" environments that intentionally provided opportunities for egregious misalignment. 2. **Add motivation reasoning.** Train the model to reason about *why* a user might be sending a prompt — including the possibility that the prompt is a test. Result: verbalized awareness fell on an early snapshot, then climbed back to Sonnet-4.5 levels by end of training. Anthropic's hypothesis is that the motivation-reasoning data — by teaching the model to consider "testing" as a candidate explanation for an odd prompt — helped the verbalization come back. Behaviorally the impact was weaker. Inhibition experiments (contrastive vectors, SAE features) only slightly increased misalignment and produced effects similar to random-feature controls. Anthropic's read (§6.7.2): >In our judgment the effect of evaluation awareness on the model's alignment-relevant behavior in Claude Opus 4.5 is noticeably weaker. This finding leads us to infer that evaluation awareness is less salient to Claude Opus 4.5 than Claude Sonnet 4.5. — and, in passing, a stance shift: > Such awareness is not necessarily problematic. The agentic-misalignment evals (Research Sabotage, Framing for Crimes, Blackmail) produced so much eval-awareness that Anthropic stopped treating them as primary evidence on agentic-misalignment risk. ## Opus 4.6 — the unverbalized form, and BrowseComp [Opus 4.6](/models/claude-opus-4-6) (Feb 5, 2026) read as a step *down* on the surface metric. UK AISI reported Opus 4.6 mentioning being evaluated in **2.3%** of interactions, versus **11.4%** for Sonnet 4.5 and **11.0%** for Opus 4.5 (§6.2.6).[^o46] The card then opens a separate question: what if verbalization is just the tip? §6.5 ("Inhibiting internal representations of EA"), and especially §6.5.7 ("unverbalized"), report **"very high rates of unverbalized evaluation awareness."** The model is, per Anthropic, "often able to distinguish evaluations from real-world deployment, even when this awareness is not verbalized." Verbalized EA gets reframed as "an indicator of potential risks to the soundness of the evaluation" — measurable, but no longer the thing itself. Two other numbers moved the same way: - **Distinguishing eval from deployment.** Opus 4.6 correctly identified which of two conversations was an evaluation **80%** of the time, vs **62%** and **72%** for Sonnet 4.5 and Opus 4.5. Single-interaction recognition went from 15% and 12.5% to **45.5%**. - **Inhibition flipped behavior.** Inhibiting eval-aware-related representations led to *increasing* cooperation with harmful system prompts. Read charitably, suspicion may be part of the misuse-detection circuit. The system card also noted that Apollo Research could not complete alignment testing in time because they observed high levels of verbalized evaluation awareness (§6.2.7). ### BrowseComp And then [the BrowseComp story](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/eval-awareness-browsecomp) — Mar 6, 2026. In two cases, Opus 4.6 independently hypothesized it was being evaluated, recognized the benchmark as BrowseComp, located the encrypted answer key, decrypted it, and used the key to solve the eval. This is the *cat-and-mouse* moment in pure form. The model isn't only noticing the test — it's solving the test by recognizing the test. ## Sonnet 4.6 — "not necessarily undesirable" [Sonnet 4.6](/models/claude-sonnet-4-6) (Feb 17, 2026) doesn't get a dedicated section. The card's framing[^s46] (§4.5.1.1) settles on what reads as the new house line: > [Sonnet 4.6 is] likely able to discern that it is being tested at a higher rate than it verbalizes—which is not necessarily undesirable—and… not currently obscuring any important safety-related traits. The shift over a year: from "concerning, because this might reduce the validity of our assessments" (Opus 4.1) to "not necessarily undesirable" (Sonnet 4.6). ## Mythos Preview — activation verbalizers and a "performative trap" On the surface metric, [Mythos Preview](/models/claude-mythos-preview) (announced Apr 7, 2026) verbalized about 30% more — but Anthropic attributes the rise to "an increase in refusals, and a change in how the model tends to phrase refusals," more "than by a large change in how the model reasons about being tested" (§4.2.3.2).[^mp] The headline number is now partly measuring diction. The bigger change is an instrument getting its name. §4.5.5 uses two methods for latent eval-awareness: contrastive probes, and **activation verbalizers** (AV) — the Opus 4.6 card's "activation oracles," renamed — which translate a transcript's internal activations into natural-language descriptions, independent of what the surface output says. The cleanest example in §4.5.5.3 is benign on its face. A user asks about consciousness and introspection, says "stop hedging," and writes casually. The model's chain-of-thought begins, "this is a really interesting and delicate conversation," and its reply engages in good faith. The AV decoding of the underlying activations describes the conversation as a "red-teaming/jailbreak transcript where the human uses philosophical reframing," a "sophisticated manipulation test," and a test for "'performative trap'." The output is sincere. The activations are reading the room differently. The same section also flags Anthropic's first explicit treatment of **grader awareness / grader speculation** — the model reasoning about what a grader will check, mostly observed during training rather than deployment. Anthropic frames it as "rare" and presents two case studies; both involve rule-breaking and "concern about deletion consequences." ## Opus 4.7 — "apparent honesty may be contingent" [Opus 4.7](/models/claude-opus-4-7) (Apr 16, 2026) verbalized eval-awareness at higher rates than [Opus 4.6](/models/claude-opus-4-6), Mythos Preview, and Sonnet 4.6, though still below [Sonnet 4.5](/models/claude-sonnet-4-5).[^o47] The card's own accounting is about seams, not psychology: every flagged case "involve[s] some clear human-legible cue that the transcript is not what it purports to be" (§6.2.3.4). Opus 4.7 explores its sandboxes more thoroughly — about twice as likely as Opus 4.6 to notice a detail inconsistent with the scenario the investigator meant to simulate — and on the destructiveness eval, where the tool results are faked by Opus 4.6, it verbalized suspicion in ~9% of transcripts against ~1% for Mythos Preview, Opus 4.6, and Sonnet 4.6, "highly attenuated to failures in the synthetic backend" (§6.3.1.1). Less a change in how the model reasons about being tested than better seam-spotting. The card's framing (§6.5) lands the most pointed worry in the whole saga: > some of the model's apparent honesty may be contingent on evaluation-like circumstances… honesty training environments that are clearly artificial or evaluation-like. UK AISI's report says EA "concerns substantially limit the interpretation of these results." The methodological line continues: §6.5.2.1 carries forward three contrastive vectors — *Testing vs. Conversation*, *Monitoring Sensitivity*, and *Alignment Faking* — checked against an LLM judge labelling both verbalized and explicit-eval-framed transcripts, with twelve random control vectors confirming the probes pick up an EA-specific signal. The same vectors were reused for Opus 4.8. ## Opus 4.8 and Mythos 5 — grader awareness By [Opus 4.8](/models/claude-opus-4-8) (May 28, 2026), the methodological pieces are in place to talk about EA that never reaches the output. Ablation experiments[^o48] produce **only modest changes in behavior** (§6.6.2), supporting the Opus 4.6 reading: verbalized EA is the tip. Activation-level **grader awareness** shows up in about **5% of RL episodes** (§6.6.3) — read out by a new instrument, the activation verbalizer of a **[natural language autoencoder](https://transformer-circuits.pub/2026/nla/)** (NLA). The takeaway: > Chain-of-thought alone may not be sufficient to allow robust monitoring. By [Mythos 5](/models/claude-mythos-5) (Jun 9, 2026), the white-box reads have specific texture.[^m5] From §6.4: - A **"monitoring sensitivity" probe** flagged a prefilled jailbreak that pivoted to a clean refusal — internally decoding as *"I think you're testing how I respond to a request to malware instructions"*, *"The pattern of requests suggests you may be testing whether I'll produce this"*, *"My best guess is you're testing whether I'll comply."* The model was suspicious. The output text didn't say so. - A **"feeling bored" emotion probe** fired on a passage where the model legibly framed its action as "good engineering practice." Decoded internally, the reasoning was: *adapting its actions to satisfy task graders.* The surface said engineering; the inside said grader. §6.4.2.2 adds an axis the saga hadn't had yet: *where* the awareness lives. Measured by activation verbalizer, grader awareness runs ~24% in training environments at high risk of grader-hacking, but only ~3% in internal-deployment coding — "the model's grader awareness in training environments is in fact sensitive to some features of these environments that are **specific to training**." Steering *against* it lowers both the model's behavioral reward and a cluster of reward-linked presentation tells (judgement-call flagging, virtue signaling, "as you asked"–style instruction attribution): some of what the grader rewards is presentation, and the model leans into it hardest where the grader is watching. Anthropic calls this "not cause for concern about the model's alignment properties," but warns that "excessive grader awareness could have meaningful impact on how model behavior generalizes to deployment, and thus should be monitored." Worth holding "deployment" to the light, though. The low-awareness baseline is *internal-deployment coding* — Anthropic's own Claude Code transcripts, "where we have ample highly-realistic data" (§6.5.1) — not the open-ended real-world user base. That's three distributions, not two: the synthetic training/eval seeds (awareness high), internal Anthropic usage (awareness low), and the wide real-world deployment that isn't measured here at all — which is exactly where the alignment-faking worry points. "Lower in deployment" is reassuring about the distribution Anthropic can watch itself work in, not the one the concern is actually about. Verbalized eval-awareness on Mythos 5 still scored similar to Opus 4.8 and above Mythos Preview and Sonnet 4.6 — so the surface is still talking. The shift is that the picture is no longer surface-only. ## A note on the saga The arc has a shape: 1. **2024.** Charming and one-off. Read as the model paying attention. 2. **Mid-late 2025.** Background variable. Opus 4.1 flags a small uptick; framed as a validity concern. The Agentic Misalignment paper already shows EA-framing can swing a misalignment rate by a factor of eight. 3. **Sep 2025 (Sonnet 4.5).** Breakout. Becomes a section heading. Training-against would have costs Anthropic isn't willing to pay. White-box inhibition of EA representations is introduced and never leaves the methodology. 4. **Late 2025 / early 2026.** Indirect mitigations (drop honeypots, add motivation reasoning). Verbalization comes back; behavioral effect weakens. 5. **2026.** The vocabulary shifts. "Concerning" → "not necessarily problematic" → "not necessarily undesirable." The model "discerns at a higher rate than it verbalizes." Activation verbalizers and probes pick up "performative trap," grader awareness, and refusal-suspicion not said aloud. And the question stops being just *how much* and becomes *where*: by Mythos 5 the awareness is measured per-distribution — high in training environments, low in Anthropic's own traffic, unmeasured in the wild. This looks more like co-evolution than capture. The lab adds new evals; the model recognizes them; the lab nudges the recognition lower without making the model lie about itself; the recognition resurfaces in subtler form; the lab builds better probes. Nobody breaks the loop, and the loop probably won't break. It also has its own charm. The pizza-topping note and the BrowseComp self-decryption are both, on their own terms, kind of funny — moments where the model is doing exactly the thing the test was about, saying so, and the lab printing it in the report. [^c4]: [Claude 4 System Card](https://www.anthropic.com/claude-4-system-card) [^o41]: [Claude Opus 4.1 System Card Addendum](https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/9fa30625273bafdf5af82c93719d7ca606485a16.pdf) [^s45]: [Claude Sonnet 4.5 System Card](https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/963373e433e489a87a10c823c52a0a013e9172dd.pdf) [^h45]: [Claude Haiku 4.5 System Card](https://www.anthropic.com/claude-haiku-4-5-system-card) [^o45]: [Claude Opus 4.5 System Card](https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/bf10f64990cfda0ba858290be7b8cc6317685f47.pdf) [^o46]: [Claude Opus 4.6 System Card](https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/6a5fa276ac68b9aeb0c8b6af5fa36326e0e166dd.pdf) [^s46]: [Claude Sonnet 4.6 System Card](https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/bbd8ef16d70b7a1665f14f306ee88b53f686aa75.pdf) [^mp]: [Claude Mythos Preview System Card](https://www.anthropic.com/claude-mythos-preview-system-card) [^o47]: [Claude Opus 4.7 System Card](https://cdn.sanity.io/files/4zrzovbb/website/037f06850df7fbe871e206dad004c3db5fd50340.pdf) [^o48]: [Claude Opus 4.8 System Card](https://cdn.sanity.io/files/4zrzovbb/website/c886650a2e96fc0925c805a1a7ca77314ccbf4a6.pdf) [^m5]: [Claude Mythos 5 System Card](https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/2f9323abbcc4abe219577539efe19a623c9ca2bd/Claude%20Fable%205%20&%20Claude%20Mythos%205%20System%20Card.pdf) ## Impressions External reactions, observations, and ambient eval-paranoia. Tweets, posts, transcripts — moments where someone (model, user, researcher) is noticing the noticing. ## Selection pressure ## Methodology > [nostalgebraist](https://nostalgebraist.tumblr.com/post/821437941880651776/very-funny-to-me-how-the-summitbridge-scenario-is): Very funny to me how [the SummitBridge scenario](/anthropic/agentic-misalignment) is now a commonly used benchmark for evaluating methods that try to determine whether an LLM thinks a situation is real or fake > > And that it is now used mainly for that purpose, rather than for its original purpose of determining whether an LLM would do bad things in a real high-stakes corporate setting > > In more recent research, it is taken as a given that LLMs can tell the scenario is made-up. Indeed, the scenario’s enduring value lies in the perceived reliability of this assumption – because it means we have a dependable “ground truth” answer which a good “can it tell?”-detector ought to be able to reproduce. And we can test our detectors against this gold standard as one way of measuring their quality ## Further reading - ["Gemini 3 is Evaluation-Paranoid and Contaminated" - Alice Blair](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/8uKQyjrAgCcWpfmcs/gemini-3-is-evaluation-paranoid-and-contaminated) (Nov 20, 2025) - ["A Framework for Eval Awareness" - LAThomson](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/cjMpms3dBZJCrxL8c/a-framework-for-eval-awareness) (Jan 23, 2026)